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ABANDONMENT.
See Insurance.
1. The legal meaning of the term abandonment, as used in a policy of n-
•surance, is a transfer to the undervriter of the interest of the assured to
the extent that intereet iscovered by the policy. The Merchants' and Manu-
facturers' Insurance Company et al. vs, Charles Duffield. - _ 662
2. A policy of insurance contained the following clanse- "And in all
c%-es of abandonment, the assured shall assign, transfer, and set over to
said insurance company, all their interest in and to the said steamb6at,
and every pnzrt,jfree of all claims and charges whatever." The steamboat
was assured only as to three-fourths of its value-was wrecked and aban-
doned to the insurance offices. Held, that the abandonment spoken of in
the clause, and noted from the policy, could only be an abandonment ia
the legal technical sense of the word, and the owner had an interest of one-
fourth in the boat after abandonment, as to which they were their own in-
surers. Ibid.
ACT OF ASSEMBLY.
See Married Woman's Act.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
See Duties, Habeas Corpus, Jurisdiction,
1. To sustain the allegations of the declaration in this suit, which is for
aiding or abetting in the escape of slaves, under the fugitive slave act of
1850, it must appear that the alleged fugitives were slaves who had escaped
from service, and had been arrested by the owner or his agent; and that
the defendant, with knowledge of these facts, aided and abetted their es-
cape. Weiner vs. Sloane. - .. .. . . 174
2. The statute authorizes an arrest, either by the owner or his agent,
with or without warrant; but when made by an agent, he must be author-
ized by a written power of attorney, executed and authenticated as re-
quired by the statute. Ibid.
3. To make the defendant liable, it must appear that he had notice or
knowledge that the slaves were fugitives, and were at the time of the al-
leged unlawful interference, in custody under an arrest; but this notice or
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. Ibid.
4. The test of the legality of an arrest is the law, and not the opinion of
the defendant. Ibid.
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5. Any words or actions tending to effect an escape, and which lead to
that result, are sufficient to implicate the defendant in the charge of aid-
ing or abetting the escape. Ibid.
6. An intention to affect an escape must appear, but such intention may
be inferred from the facts. Every one is presumed to have intended the
result necessarily and legitimately flowing from his acts. Ibid.
7. A party acting as counsel for a fugitive slave, is protected from the
consequences of his acts, so far only as they are within the proper limits
of his professional duty. Ibid.
ADMIRALTY.
1. The admiralty has not jurisdiction of a libel for freight on merchan-
dise carried in a canal boat, about two hundred and fifty miles by canal,
and only about forty miles on tide-water. Wallis vs. Chesney. - - 307
2. To give jurisdiction on a contract of affreightment, the principal or
chief part of the service must be under the contract to be performed on tide-
water. Ibid.
ADULTERY.
In order to find a true bill against one charged with adultery, the grand
jury must be satisfied that he was a married man at the time of the com-
mission of the offence, and that the woman with whom the act was proved
to have been committed, was the wife of another man living at the time.
Charge per Galbraith, P. J. - - 209
AGENT.
1. Where a power of attorney is executed, authorizing the attorney "to
make loans and contract debts, and for such purpose use the name of the
principal," and the attorney makes a loan, but instead of receiving money
receives a draft on New York, this is a proper exercise of his authority.
Atwater vs. Roelofson. - - - - - - - 549
2. Where a corporation had stock at its disposal, and gave an agent
power to sell it in market and issue certificates therefor, any person pur-
chasing it of the agent in good faith and paying value, would acquire a
perfect title to it, although the agent by a secret fraud intended the trans-
action for his own benefit, and used the funds he received. The President
of the Mechanics' Bank, against The New York and New Haven Railroad
Company. 717
3. But no right would in such case be acquired by one not dealing with
the agent in good faith, or paying nothing for the stock; and the certifi-
cate given such person would be void. Ibid.
4. Schuyler, the transfer agent of the New Haven Railroad Company,
had no power to issue certificates for stock, except upon a transfer on the
Company's books by a previous owner, and a surrender of that owner's
certificate. He was merely an agent for making transfers, and had no
general power to issue certificates. Ibid.
5. Neither the board of directors, nor the whole body of the corporation,
had power to create stock beyond the number of shares limited by the
charter; and if the purchaser had paid fall value to the transfer agent
for certificates of stock issued beyond the number limited by the charter,
the certificates would be void. Ibid.
6. The plaintiffs in this action, holding certificates by transfer from
one to whom they were fraudulently issued, and which represented no
stock, acquire no rights as stockholders. Ibid.-
The certificates were void in the hands of the first holder, because fraudu-
lently issued.
They were void in his hands, because issued without authority, there
having been no surrender of a previous certificate and transfer, on the
books, of actual stock.
They were void, because the stock they professed to represent had no
real existence, and under the charter of the Company, could not have any.
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They were void, under all possible circumstances, so that no person
can claim under them rights as a stockholder, or damages for the refusal
to admit him to such rights.
7. The law will not require a corporaticn to violate its charter bycreat-
ing an excess of stock to supply a spurious certificate; it will not punish
it in damages for refusing to be guilty of such a violation. Ibid.
8. By a purchase of a certificate of stock in acorporation with a power to
transfer it, thepurchaser, before transfer, acquires an equitable titleto the
vendor's stock; and if the vendor's title is open to no impeachment, a right
to call upon the corporation to permit him to clothe himself with the legal
title, by a transferupon the books and a certificate; but he acquires no
new or superior rights against the corporation. Ibid.
9. Certificates of stock in a corporation are not negotiable instruments
in the sense of the commercial law, so that by their endorsement and de-
livery to a purchaser in good faith, a title to the stock they profess to re-
present may be acquired, if it be spurious or void in the hands of the
vend6r. Ibid.
10. The holder of a false or fraudulent certificate of stock capnot, by
endorsing and transferring it to another, create a title to the stock it pro-
fesses to represent, hostile to the corporation. Ibid.
11. Certificates of stock in a corporation are not in any sense securities
-for money, but simply the muniments and evidence of the holder's title to
his interest in the corporate property. Ibid.
12. Nor are they in the nature of letters of credit, on the faith of which
every one may act. Neither by their terms, nor by implication, do they
request, invite, or guaranty credit, any more than the possession of pro-
perty of any description, or choses in action. Ibid.
13. An agent may clothe his act with all the indicia of authority, ani
yet the act may not be within the real or apparent power. The principal
is responsible for the apparentpower; not for the appearance of the act, if
unauthorized. Ibid.
14. The employment of an agent in situations of trust, is not such a re-
commendation by his principal as to render him liable to others whom the
agent has deceived to their injury, except where the fraud is committed
in doing the principal's business. Ibid.
15. The doctrine of estoppel is not applicable in this case. The false cer-
tificate contains no representation or admission which any third party
may accept as addressed to himself, and intended to influence his con-
duct. Ibid.
ALIEN.
See Infant
1. By the common law, an alien signifies one born in a foreign Country,
and itis the doctrine of the English law that natural born subjectscannot di-
vest themselves of the duty of allegiance to the country of their nativity.
The statutes giving to the children of natural born subjects the rights of
English natural born subjects, though born in a foreign country, are stat-
utes of naturalization, giving certain privileges without the volition of the
subject, and without the condition of residence. If they determine imper-
atively the stawut of the natives of other countries, they conflict with the
doctrine of natural allegiance, and also with the rights of the citizens of
other States, and with the sovereignty of other governments. In re Daw-
s o n ...- - 2 4 1
2. Treaties made by the United States removing the disability of aliens
to inherit are valid and within the intent of the Constitution of the United
States. The People vs. Gerke. - 604
ARREST.
See Acts of Congress.
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ATTESTATION.
See Will.
BEQUEST.
A bequest in a will "I leave the whole of said fund in the hands of my
executor, to be by him applied to the support of Missionaries in India, as
it is my desire to aid, &c., the same to be applied under the direction of
the General Assembly's Board of Missions of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States," is void for uncertainty. Board of Missions vs. McMas.
ter, . .. ..-- 26
BILL OF LADING.
See Common Carrier.
BOND.
1. Coupons or interest warrants attached to bonds of a city, issued to a
railroad~company, for stock, by the city subscribed for, in pursuance of a
local law, are not original obligations or promises to pay the bearer, and
have no legal validity independently of the bond. Clark vs. City of Janes-
ville, . . . . . . . . . 591
2. The assignee of such bonds cannot maintain a suit in his own name,
there being no law in the State authorizing it. Ibid.
S. Such bonds do not, by assignment to bearer, assume the character of
negetiable paper, for the purpose of suit by the bearer. Ibid.
BROKER.
1. A public note or Will broker who sells a note, impliedly warrants the
genuineness of the signatures and endorsements; and should the bill prove
to be forged, the loss must fall upon the vendor. Rieman vs. Fisher, - 433
2. A public broker must be regarded as the principal in his business
transactions, unless he discloses his agency at the time of the sale. Ibid.
CANAL BOAT.
See Admiralty.
CASES COMMENTED ON.
Hazelbaker vs. Reeves, 2 Jones, 264, and Davis vs. Steiner, 2 Harris,
275. Burrvs. Burr, - - - - 559
CASES DISSENTED FROM.
Peel vs. Merchants' Insurance Company, 3 Mason, 27. Marine Insur-
ance Company vs. Goodman, - - - 481
Reynolds vs. Ocean Insurance Company, 22 Pick. 171. Ibid, - - 495
CASES DOUBTED OR DENIED.
laxter vs. Duren, 29 Maine, 440. Rieman vs. Fisher, - - 437
CITIZEN.
See Corporation-
CLERGYMEN.
See Witness.
COMITY.
See Equity, Infant, Lien.
1. Where the English Court of Chancery, when refusing to award
the custody of the minor to the American guardian, decreed that the
guardian should transmit the income of the minor's property to England to
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be disposed of under the direction of that Court-Held, That under the
circunstances, there was no good reason for deferring ex comitate to the
decision of the foreign tribunal, and permission was therefore refused to
the guardian to transmit the funds abroad. In re Dawson, - - 241
2. There is no reason why the same degree of comity should not be ex-
tended to the judicial action of the Surrogates' Courts in the State of New
York, tha.t would be extended to any other tribunal of a foreign country in
the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction. Ibid.
COMMON CARRIERS.
See Contract.
1. Railroads, as common carriers, may make a valid contract to carry
beyond the limits of their own route, and thus assume all responsibility,
adopt the acts, and become liable for the negligence of others. Noyes vs.
Rutland and Burlington Railroad Company, - - - 231
2. A carrier by contract, may undertake a personal delivery beyond the
limits of his route, of merchandise entrusted to him. I bid.
3. Semble, That where a carrier receives goods marked for a particular
destination, beyond the route for which he professes to carry, and beyond
the terminus of his road, he is bound only, in the absence of any special
agreement, to transport and deliver such merchandise according to the es-
tablished usage of the business, and is not liable for losses beyond his own
line. Jenueson vs. The Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation
Company, - - - - 234
CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY.
See Constitutional Law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Alien, Lien.
1. The provision of the Constitution of the United States expressly
conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, does not authorize
the exercise of appellate power by that tribunal, over the State courts,
but extends simply to appeals from the subordinate federal courts. Stunt
vs. The Steamboat Ohio, . . . .. 49
2. There is no provision in the Constitution, from which a supervising
power in the Supreme Court of the United States over the State courts,
can be derived by way of incident or implication. Ibid.
3. The Supreme Court of the United States has not been constituted the
exclusive tribunal of last resort, to determine all controversies in relation
to conflicts of authority between the federal government and the several
States of the Union. Ibid.
4. The State courts and the federal courts are co-ordinate tribunals,
having concurrent jurisdiction in numerous cases, but neither having a
supervising power over the other; and where the jurisdiction is concurrent,
the decision of that court, or rather, of the courts of that judicial system
in which the jurisdiction first attaches, is final and conclusive as to the
parties. Ibid.
5. That the Legislature of Ohio has no constitutional authority, when
conferring special privileges on a corporation, to abridge or relinquish to
any extent, or in any manner whatsoever, by contract or otherwise, any portion
of the power of taxation over its corporate property, has been settled by
solemn adjudication, and is not now an open question in this State. The
'Milan and Richland Plank Road Company vs. Husted, Treasurer, - 213
6. The ninth section of the charter of this corporation, which specially
provides, that, in consideration of the expenditures which the company will
necessarily have to incur in making and keeping up its plank road, the
property of the corporation of every kind shall be forever exempt from
taxation, must be construed with reference to the constitutional powers of
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the legislature, and as operative only to exempt the company from taxation
under the authority of any law existing at the time the act of incorporation
vas passed, but as wholly inoperative as against any subsequent law
imposing a tax upon the company. Ibid.
7. A law being an imperative rule of action prescribed by the supreme
power of the government from the paramount considerations of the public
interests, cannot in its nature, be a contract, inasmush as it is of the
essence of a contract, that it be an agreement between two competent
parties upon a mutual consideration, and in relation to a matter which is
the legitimate subject matter of bargain and sale. Ibid.
8. There is a plain distinction between a law authorizing a contract to
be made and a contract made under its authority. And where a contract
is made pursuant to the authority or direction of a statute, for the transfer
of property or the performance of services, a vested right may be created;
and where this is the case, the repeal or amendment of the law would
leave the obligations of the contract still existing and unimpaired. Ibid.
9. The legislative or law-making power comprehends full control over
existing laws by amendment or repeal, as well as the power of enacting
new laws. Ibid.
10 This high trust of civil authority must, under the constitution of
this State, continue in fell force, and complete in its operation, at every
session of the legislature, and the general assembly cannot, by contract
or otherwise, at one session impose any restraint, limitation or abridgment
on the exercise of the legislative power at any subsequent session; nor can
this body, in the enactment of a law, provide by contract or otherwise
against its amendment or repeal at a subsequent session. Ibid.
11. Legislative power is an attribute of sovereignty belonging to the
people, to be exercised only by their representatives. The extent of the
grant of it to the Legislature, with its reservations and restrictions, are to
be found only in the Constitution itself. The State vs. Allmond, - - 533
12. The Legislature has power, as a police regulation, to prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquor; subject only to the laws of the United States
regulating imports; and these protect it only in the hands of the importer,
in the original cask or package. Ibid.
13. Though a State is bound to admit an article thus imported under
the laws of Congress, it is not bound to find a market for its sale. Ibid.
14. When sold by the importer in the original cask or package, or when
broken up for retail sale, it becomes subject to the State laws; and may
be taxed, or the sale of it prohibited. Ibid.
15. Property in an article is the right to have and use it subject to law.
The right of sale is not an essential ingredient that may not be separated
from the ownership; and a law regulating or prohibiting the sale, does not
take away any vested right of property. Ibid.
16. In the social state, individual property is necessarily held subject to
such laws of regulation as are required for the well-being of society; and
and in a sovereign State, the legislature, having the power to pass such
laws, must judge of its limits and extent. Ibid.
17. The Act of 1855 prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor for any
other than "mechanical, chemical and medicinal purposes only, and pure
wines for sacramental use," saving the rights of the importer of foreign
liquor under the importation laws, is Constitutional. Ibid.
18. A law which absolutely forbids the people of the State to manufacture
and sell whisky, ale, porter and beer, for use as a beverage, or at all,
except for the government, to be sold by it as medicine, and absolutely
prohibits the use of these articles as a beverage, is unconstitutional. Per
Pn.nKiNs, T. Herman vs. The State, - - 44
19. It is an invasion by the government upon the faculties of industry
possessed by individuals, when it attempts to appropriate to itself any
particular branches of industry, or any business which is not of a public
general character. Ibid.
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20. There are certain absolute rights, and the right of property is
among them, which in all free governments must of necessity be protected
from legislative interference, irrespective of constitutional checks and
guards. Ibid
21. The power of the legislature to declare nuisances. Ibid.
CONSTRUCTION.
See Deed.
CONTEMPT,
See Habeas Corpus.
1. In Vermont a decree of the Court of Chancery for contempt in
disobeying an injunction, is not removable into the Supreme Court by
appeal, it not being a "final decree in the cause." Vilas vs. Burton, 168
2. Proceedings for contempt in one court, where the court has jurisdic-
tion, are not revisable in any court. Ibid.
CONTRACT.
See Constitutional Law.
1. By the original ordinance for the construction and management of
the gas works of the old city of Philadelphia, the city was authorized, if
it should deem expedient, to take possession of the works, and to convert the
stock thereby created into a redeemable loan. The works in the meantime
were to be controlled and managed in all respects by a board of-trustees
appointed by the City Councils. Additional stock was created by subse-
quent ordinances, with the same reservation of right to the city. In June,
1841, the city exercised this right, and certificates of loan were issued to
the former stockholders. On June, 14, 1841, an ordinance was passed
authorizing a further loan for the extension of the works, by which the
works were pledged for the payment of principal and interest of "all loans
made for or on account of said gas works;" the faith of the city was
pledged that the price of gas should not be reduced so as to reduce the
clear profits below 8 per cent. a year; and it was expressly stipulated
that the gas works and the funds thereof should be wholly controlled and
managed by a board of trustees elected and constituted as theretofore, and
who were to pay no part of the said funds into the City Treasury, until
all the principal and interest of said loans should be fully paid. Loans
were taken under the provisions of subsequent ordinances. In 1854, after
the passage of the Act to consolidate the city of Philadelphia, which pro-
vided for the creation of a department of gas, an ordinance was intro-
duced and passed by the Common Council of the new city, which in effect
took the whole control and management of the gas works and their funds
from the trustees, and placed it in the hands of an officer to be styled Chief
Engineer of the Gas Works, who was to be at the head of that department.
In consequence of this action, the loanholders filed a bill to prevent the
city from intermeddling or interfering with the trustees, or from attempt-
ing to invalidate the trust. lield, that the ordinance of 1841 created a
contract between the city and the loanholders, present and future, which
it was incompetent to invalidate, either by removing the property of the
works from the trustees, or. by altering the price of gas so as to lower the
profits of the works below eight per cent. The Western Saving Fund
Society of Philadelphia vs. The City of Philadelphia, - - - 669
2. A city, in the supply of gas to its citizens, acts as a private corpora-
tion, and is subject to the same duties, liabilities, and disabilities. It can-
not impair the obligation of a contract entered into by it in that capacity,
because it may deem it for the benefit of its citizens so to do. Ibid.
3. A corporation cannot adopt the acts of its agents, as between itself
and strangers, when such acts are beneficial to itself, and repudiate the
same acts, when the result is disastrous, on the ground of want of author-
ity in the agen4 to act under its charter of incorporation. Noyes v. The
Rutland and Burlington Railroad, . . .. 281
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CORPORATION.
1. Under the present state of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, a corporation is not per se a "citizen within the meaning
of the third article of the constitution, which gives jurisdiction to the fede-
ral courts over controversies between "citizens of different states." But
where a corporation sues or is sued, its governing officers, as the Presi-
dent and Directors, are the substantial party; and if they are citizens of
the State which created the corporation, and the other party is a citizen
of some other State, the federal courts, have jurisdiction, and the provi-
sions of the judiciary act with regard to the removal of such causes from
State courts apply. Wheeden vs. The Camden and Amboy Railroad Co., 296
2. It is not material in such case the corporation has an office and does
a large business in the State of which the other party is a citizen; nor
that some of its stockholders are citizens thereof. Ibid.
3. It is to be presumed in the first instance that the governing officers
of the corporation are citizens of the State which created it, and in which
it does business. Ibid.
4. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in a ques-
tion of the construction of the constitution,.are conclusive upon the State
courts. Ibid.
CUSTOMS.
See Duties.
DEATH.
1. An action cannot be maintained by the administrator, or other per-
sonal representative of a deceased party, under the Statute of March 25,
1851, requiring compensation for causing death by wrongful act, Neglect,
or default, when the act causing the death occurred without the State.
Campbell, Administratrix, vs. Rogers, -. . . 747
2. That Statute applies only to those cases, where the wrongful act, neglect,
or default, causing death, has occured within the State. Ibid.
DEED.
1. A deed to A B, and his heirs, except C B, one of the sons of A B,
conveys only a life estate to A B. Blake and Wife vs. Hyde and others, 172
2. The remainder in fee vests immediately in those persons who will
become his heirs, if they survive him, excepting C B, who takes by pur-
chase and not by inheritance. ATbid.
3. Quere, whether there is any just ground for the distinction between
deeds and other instruments, in regard to the necessity of the use of the
words heir, or heirs, to create an estate in fee simple or fee tail. Ibid.
DIVORCE.
A decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, although obtained by
fraud, cannot be set aside on an original libel, filed at a subsequent term.
Greene vs. Greene, - - - 42
DOMICIL.
See Comity, Guardian, Infant, Lex loci.
1. From comity and considerations of mutual interest, foreign States
recognize and give effect almost universally to those laws of the domicil
which constitute the status, quality, or capacity of the person, and which
place minors under the authority of guardians and tutors, respect being
had to the sentence of the appropriate tribunal in the place of domicil.
In re Dawson, - .. . . . . 241
2. In the case of a minor born in the city of New York, of a father there
resident, a naturalized citizen, and a mother there resident a native citi-
zen, the residence of the parents there continuing until their decease, the
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place of birth and the domicil of the parents made New York the place of
the domicil of the child. Ibid.
3. The domicil of origin can be changed only by choice, and a domicil
of choice cannot be acquired by the act of the minor, or of any other per-
son, except the parents or the guardian. Ibid.
DUTIES.
1. Where certain liquors were imported into the United States in casks,
which upon being gauged were found to be redueed in quantity by leak-
ags, it was held that no duties could be imposed except upon the quantity
which actually arrived in the country, and which is to be ascertained by
the gauger's return. Sturges vs. The United States, - - - 335
2. Mode of recovering excess of duties, or estimated duties under Acts
of March 3, 1839; February 26, 1845; and August 8, 1846, considered
and commented on. Ibid.
EQUITY.
See Injunction.
1. Where the courts of a State in their ordinary jurisdiction as courts
of equity, undertake to aid and direct an administrator in the execution
of his trust, and where the interests of the State's own citizens as well as
of non-residents are involved, and the non-residents are made parties to
the cause in the manner pointed out by special legislation, the rule of
comity requires that paramount authority should be yielded to the court
before which the proceedings were first instituted, and where the jurisdic-
tion first attaches, notwithstanding the courts may have concurrent juris-
diction, one being a Federal and the other a State tribunal. The Board
of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church vs. McMaster, - - 626
2. A bill in equity may be maintained by one underwriter against the
insured and the other underwriters, on the same vessel for an account and
an adjustment of the loss among the parties, in order to prevent a multi-
tiplicity of suits. Insurance Company vs. Goodman, - - - 481
3. Where A and B exchanged farms, A agreeing to pay B one thousand
dollars, in addition to the farm which was to be conveyed to him, and the
wife of A refuses to unite with her husband in the conveyance, which re-
fusal is by the contrivance of A, the court will not deprive B of the bene-
fit of a specific performance of the contract, and will refer the matter to a
master to settle the conveyance, so as to afford B complete indemnity.
Paul vs. Young, - .- 412
4. Where a complainant, on the faith of an agreement with the defend-
ant, has put himself in a situation from which he cannot extricate himself,
this circumstance will induce a court of equity to give him relief. Ibid.
5. Where a court of equity will decree a specific performance. Ibid.
FEDERAL COURTS.
See Constitutional Law.
FOREIGN SHIP.
See Patent.
FORGERY.
See Broker.
FRAUD.
See Divorce.
GUARANTY.
1. In case of guaranty, demand of payment of the principal debtor, and
notice of his default, are requisite to charge the guarantor, only wherd
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the fact on which his liability is made dependent rests peculiarly within
the knowledge of the guarantee, or depends on his option. Bashford vs.
Shaw. 609
2. But where the contingency which determines the liability of a guar-
antor, is one which is known to him, or which he is bound to know, or
where each party has, in legal contemplation, equal means of information,
the guarantor must take notice at his peril. Ibid.
3. In order to discharge a guarantor from liability, on the ground of
want of notice of the default of the principal debtor, there must be, not
only a want of the notice within a reasonable time, but there must be also
some actual loss or damage thereby caused to the guarantor. And if such
loss or damage does not go to the whole amount of the claim, but is only
in part, the guarantor is not wholly discharged, but onlypro tanto. Ibid.
4. If the principal debtor be solvent when the note falls due, and due
notice of the default be not given, and the principal afterwards, and be-
fore notice, becomes insolvent, the guarantor is discharged. Ibid.
5. The continued insolvency of the principal debtor from the time of
the maturity of the debt, as a general thing, dispenses with the necessity
of the notice, in order to charge the guarantor. Ibid.
6. Where the undertaking of the party is to guaranty the payment of
the note of another, afterfinal process, the prosecution of the claim to final
process against the maker of the note is essential, in order to charge the
guarantor. Ibid.
7. But an omission to bring suit against the original debtor, within a
reasonable time, will not discharge the guarantor from liability, where
the terms of the guaranty do not describe th e degree of diligence to be
used in the proceeding, by suit, and where in consequence of the contin-
ued insolvency of the principal debtor from the time of the maturity of
the debt, the guarantor suffered no less by the delay. Ibid.
GUARDIAN.
1. Where a resident in Louisiana died intestate, leaving two minor
children surviving him, who had been placed, in the father's lifetime, in
the care of an uncle in the State of New York, and he having, after the
father's-death, been duly appointed their guardian there, an application
made in Louisiana by the uncle to set aside proceedings in that State,
appointing the grandmother tutrix will be refused; neither will the court
decree a sum of money to be paid to the New York guardian for the sup-
port and education of the children. Powers vs. Mortee. - - - 427
2. Authority conferred on a guardian in New York can give him no
right to come into Louisiana, and take the minor's property there, which
is already in the possession of a legal tutrix. I bid.
3. The rights and duties of guardians are strictly local. Ibid.
4. The domicil of the minor must follow the domicil of the father.
I bid.
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. The doctrines laid down in 3 Am. Law Register, 729, re-a~firmed.
2. Where a habeas corpus is issued by a master on behalf of slaves, al-
leged to have been carried away by force from him, and the defendant is
committed for a contempt in not making a proper return to the writ, the
court will not entertain a motion to quash the proceedings upon the peti-
tion and suggestion of one of the negroes that she is and was absenting
herself from her master voluntarily, and that she is not nor ever was in
the custody, possession, power or control of the defendant;, such slave
not coming or being brought personally within the jurisdiction or before
the court, in order to make the application. United States ez relat.
Wheeler vs. Passmore Williamson. - - - - - 5
:3. A writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed in the first instance,
'where it appears on the face of the petition that the relator must be re-
manded at the hearing. Ibi
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4. The legality of a commitment for a contempt by one court, cannot be
inquired into by another court, especially one of a different sovereignty
(as is tie case between the federal and State courts,) on habeas corpus or
otherwise. Ibid.
5. Nor is it material in such case that there was a want of jurisdiction
over the original proceeding. in the course of which the commitment for
contempt was made. Kxox, J., dissenting. Bx parte Passmore William-
son. - .. ..- 27
0. The 7th section of the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1833, au-
thorizes any judge of the United States to issue the writ of habeas
corpus where an officer of the United States is imprisoned "for any act
done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States.
Ex parte Robinson, Marshal. 617"
7. It is tie proper remedy where a marshal is imprisoned by the sen-
tence of a State judge as for a contempt in not producing the bodies of
certain persons named in a writ of habeas corpus, issued by such judge,
and if it appears from the evidence that such persons were legally in the
custody of the marshal pursuant to tie provisions of the Fugitive Slave
Act, and that his refusal to produce them belore the State judge was a
paramount duty by the terms of the said act, the marshal is entitled to his
discharge under the said 7th section of the act of 1883. Ibid.
8. In ordering his discharge on a habeas, a judge of the United States
does not assume a jurisdiction to review or reverse the sentence or judg-
ment of the State judge, but merely exercises a power expressly conferred
by an Act of Congress. Ibid.
9. Although the authorities are not nniform as to the right of a State
judge to issue the writ of habeas corpus, where the imprisonment is under
the authority of a law of the United States, it is well settled, that when
the fact is proved that the imprisonment is under such authority, the ju-
risdiction of the State judge is at an end, and all subsequent proceedings
are coram non judice. Ibid.
INFANT.
See Comity.
1. Where an infant, a native citizen of the State of New York, and domi-
ciled in the City of New York, and having a guardian duly appointed at
the place of domicil, was clandestinely, and adversely to the wishes of the
guardian, removed from his jurisdiction and taken to England-Held,
That the guardian was justified in attempting to recover the custody of
the ward, by invoking the aid of the English Courts, and that the ex-
penses of such proceedings were a proper charge on the inihnt's estate.
In Re Dawson, an infant. - . . . . . 241
2. The Surrogate, in respect to minors residing in his county, has the
same extent of authority as to the appointment of guardians as was possessed
by the late Court of Chancery of this State, whose jurisdiction was commen-
surate with that of the English Court of Chancery. The statute directing
such notice to be given to the relatives residing in the county as the Sur-
rogate shall think reasonable, does not exclude that officer from directing
notice to any parties likely to be interested in the welfare of the minor,
whether residing in the County or State, or even in a foreign country. lb.
S. In making the appointment of guardian, the Surrogate's power and
discretion are entirely unlimited, except by such known and established
principles as govern the conscience of all Courts of Equity. Relatives,
whether residing in another county or State, may be appointed to the
guardianship, if they are proper persons, and give the requisite security.
The consent of relatives is not requisite to the appointment. The autho-
rity of the Surrogate is not limited in this respect-the relatives have no
control in the matter, and they have no interest as parties, but receive
notice merely to inform the court so as to make the best appointment for
the welfare and interests of the child. Ibid.
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4. The Surrogate possesses power to remove a guardian, on proper cause
being shown. Ibid.
5. The powers of a guardian appointed by the Surrogate are not restricted
by locality, more than in the case of any other officer in this State. He
is recognized as the lawful guardian throughout the bounds of the State.
le cannot, in a strict sense, exercise authority out of this State, but he is
no more a local officer than an executor, or administrator, or a guardian
appointed by the Court of Chancery. Except as connected by the Con-:
stitution of the United States, which does not touch the civil domestic
government, New York is as much a foreign State, relatively to the other
States of the Union, as England is relatively to France. ibid.
INJUNCTION.
1. By the charter of the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad Com-
pany, it is provided, that when any land or right of way is required for
the construction of the road, and the company and the proprietors of the
land cannot agree upon the value thereof, a commission shall issue from
the Court of Common Pleas to assess the value, whose return shall be
made to the same court, and upon payment or tender of the value so
assessed, the lands or right of way shall vest in the company. Hedd, that
the company were not authorized to enter on the land for the purpose of
constructing the road until they had procured an assessment to be made,
and had paid or tendered the amount assessed, and that an injunction
was properly granted to restrain their proceedings. Bird vs. the Wil-
mington and Manchester Railroad Company. - - - 222
2. Legislative license to corporations to enter upon and appropriate the
lands of an individual against his consent, is against common right, and
such acts should be strictly construed. Corporations deviating from the
line prescribed by the act, or transcending the authority vested in them,
may be restrained by injunction. Ibid.
3. As ancillary to the relief by injunction, it is competent for the Court
of Chancery to decree damages for waste or injury already sustained, the
same to be ascertained by an issue quantum damnificatus, or in cases where
neither the facts nor amounts are complicated, by reference to the master
of the court. Ibid.
INSURANCE.
See Abandonment.
1. An insurer is liable for a total loss only where an abandonment has
been made and actually or constructively accepted, or where there has
been in fact an actual or technical total loss. The doctrine of some deci-
sions, that he can be made thus liable by reason of even the "highest
probability" of an actual or technical loss, without acceptance of an aban-
donment, held to be unsound. The Marine Dock and Miltual Ins. Co. vs.
Goodman. - - - - 481
2. Where an insurance has been effected in the name of one "for the
benefit of whom it may concern," and he abandons, the other parties
interested, even if he is to be considered prima facie their agent for that
purpose, may, where they have not in fact concurred, disavow the agency
within a reasonable time, either expressly or by their acts, and thus repu-
diate the abandonment. The taking possession and sale of a vessel, by a
mortgagee whose interest was insured under such general words, after an
abandonment by the mortgagor who was the nominal insurer, but before
acceptance thereof, held, to be a dissent from the abandonment. Ibid.
3. After an abandonment has been made, but not agreed to, the taking
possession of and raising and repairing the vessel by the underwriter,
accompanied, however, by an express refusal to accept the abandonment,
is no waiver of his right to treat it as a case of partial loss, if it prove to
be so, provided there be no assertion of title or act of ownership on his part.
That the underwriter must in such case repair and tender the vessel in area-
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.,onable time. is; not. it woul,1 seen]. necessary. leynolds vs. Ocean Ins.
Co., 22 Pick. 171, so ftar disagreed to. Ibid.
-4. The American doctrine of'a technical total loss doubted. Ibid.
Ii. In determining whether a technical total hiss has been incurred, upon
a valued policy, the actual value of the ve2-sel at the time of the disaster
i' to be taken, and not the valuation of the policy, and'the proportion of
la-' is to be ascertained by deducting the cost of repairs from the value of
the vessel when repaired. Ibid.
(Y. Where a steamboat under a valued policy had been snagged and sunk
in a river in Alabama. and the underwriters while refusing to accept an
ahandonment, had tie boat raised, taken to Mobile, and there repaired,
hut he expenses of raising the boat had been greatly increased on account
(if misrepresentations by the master as to her condition at the time, it was
held that the question of a technical total loss was to be determined by
deducting what would have been the reasonable cost of raising the vessel,
in addition to the eo~t of taking the vessel'to Mobile and repairing her
there. froln the value of tie vessel when the repairs were completed.
lctfire le:t% ing the vessel the master had dismantled her without necessity,
held also that the cost of restoring the vessel to her former condition in
this respect was not to be included in the computation. Ibid.
7. The court considering the case to have been one only of partial loss,
and the boat having been sold by the mortgagee subsequently to the
repairs, it was held that the underwriters were entitled to claim as against
the insured, for the work done and materials furnished in and about rais-
ing, taking the boat to Mlobile and there repairing her. Ibid.
S. An account in this case was directed to be taken, as follows: 1.
The underwriters to be allowed the reasonable (not the actual) cost of
raising and taking the boat to Mobile, the reasonable cost of taking care
of her till possession taken by the mortgagee, the reasonable cost of
repairs, and any deductions required by the policy. 2. The underwriters
to be charged with two-thirds of such cost of raising, taking to Mobile,
and repairing. Ibid.
9. The insured upon a partial loss is to be allowed the reasonable cost
of taking the vessel to the place of repairing, though in the course of her
voyage, where the nature of the disaster is such that she has ceased to
earn freght or passage money. Ibid.
INTEREST.
Though a mortgagee, on a sale of the mortgaged premises under a prior
incumbrance, is entitled to receive (besides the principal) interest out of
the surplus proceeds only to the day of sale, yet it still continues to run on
the debt secured, until the actusal receipt of the money on the final distri-
bution. Hence, in such case. the creditor may subsequently recover in
an action on the bond, any interest which has accrued between these two
periods, notwithstanding that the mortgage itself has been satisfied.
Gordon vs. Shalleross. - - - - 09
JURISDICTION.
See Admiralty, Corporation, Constitutional Law, Equity, Orphans' Court.
1. The federal courts are excluded from jurisdiction of suits upon such
bonds, issued to a corporation or citizen of the same State of the obliger,
by Sect. 11 of the Act of Congress of 1789, to establish the judicial
courts of the United States. Clarke vs. City of Janesville, - 591
2. The power to naturalize is made a judicial power by the Act of Con-
gress. Ex parte Frank Knowles. 598
3. Congress cannot confer any judicial power upon a State court. Ibid.
4. The provision of the Constitution of the United States, which gives
Congress the power to establish "An uniform rule of naturalization," is
construed to mean-that the rule when established shall be executed by
the States. Ibid.
50
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5. The Legislature of California has, by express enactment, conferred
jurisdiction on the District Courts of the State to grant naturalization,
according to the rules established by Congress. Ibid.
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.
See Constitutional Law.
An act regulating the time and manner of taling fish in the sea, within
the territorial limits of the State, is within the authority of the State
legislature, and binding on citizens of other States, and on vessels enrolled
and licensed as fishing vessels under the laws of the United States. Dun-
ham vs. Lamphere. - - - 757
LEGISLATIVE LICENSE.
See Injunction.
LEX LOCI.
1. A. loaned E. A. $10,000; the loan was made in the city of Cincinnati,
and was received in a draft drawn by D. in Cincinnati on A. in New Haven,
which was accepted, payable in -New York, and there paid. Atwater vs.
Roelofson et al. - - - -. 54i
2. To secure the payment of said loan, E. A. by her attorney executed
a promissory note for $10,000, payable five years after date, and also ten
other notes for the sum of five hundred dollars each, payable semi-annually,
being the interest notes on said loan at the rate of ten per cent ; all said
notes were payable at the office of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co.,
N.Y.
To secure the payment of said notes, E. A. executed a mortgage to A.
on certain real estate in the city of Cincinnati.
In suit brought in Cincinnati to collect the amount of these notes, and
to foreclose this mortgage-
Held, That the law of Ohio, (where it was lawful to contract for ten per
cent. interest,) governed the construction of this contract, and not the law
of New York, where a similar contract would have been void for usury.
Ibid.
3. Where in such suit a counterclaim is filed, asking the cancelation of
said notes and mortgage on the ground of usury; in no case would the
court grant such affirmative relief, unless the party should do what was
equitable and just, viz: pay back the money he actually received. Ibid.
4. Wills of real estate are governed, so far as relates to the forms of
execution, by the law of the place where the land is situated. Hunt vs.
Mootrie. - - 895
5. Where the decedent made his will at Charleston, in South Carolina,
where he then had his domicil, according to the forms prescribed by the
laws of that State, and subsequently removed to the city of New York,
where he died-Held, that the will so made was valid as to personalty,
though not solemnized in conformity to the laws of this State. Ibid.
6. In the continental jurisprudence, the rule that the act is valid if per-
formed according to the ex loci, is universal in respect to a testamentary
disposition of movables. Ibid.
7. Where the lez loci actus and the ez loci domicilii are both conformed
to, so far as relates to the forms of the testament, a subsequent change of
domicil to a place where other forms are required, will not invalidate the
instrument. Ibid.
8. The statutes of New York recognize the validity of foreign wills of
personalty made according to the le loci actus, and do not admit of a
revocation to be effected by a change of domicil. Ibid.
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LIEN.
The statute of Kentucky, which gives to material-men and others their
lien upon steamers, &c., is not unconstitutional in extending that lien to
work clone. &c., out of the State. But it cannot be applied in such case,as against a Lona/ide purchaser in any other State, in which the lien does
not exist, or has expired. Wightman vs. The Stetunboat Albree. - 119
LIMITATIONS.
1. That a debt is barred by the statute of limitations of the State in
which it was contracted, and of which both plaintiff and defendant con-
thoe citizens and residents, cannot be pleaded in bar to a suit for that
debt in the courLs of this State. Crocker vs. Arey. - - - 462
2. The first coming into the State of a person is to be construed as a
return into the State" within the meaning of see. 2 of "an act for the
limitation of certain personal actions," (lhode Island Dig. 1814, p. 221.)
Ibid.
3. An acknowledgment to take a ease out of the statute of limitations
must not only be clear, distinct and unequivocal, of the existence of a debt,
but it must. also be plainly referable to the very. debt on which the action
is based. Burr, Administratrix, &c. vs. Burr. - 558
LIQUOR LAW.
See Constitutional Law.
MANDAMUS.
1. Under the voluntary system of church government, in this countr
(except, it would seem. in cases of actual endowment), a mandamus can-
not issue to compel the trustees or members of a particular church to
admit a minister to the exercise of his spiritual functions, and this, though
he may have been duly appointed thereto by the superior ecclesiastical
autihority,-e. g. by a Methodist yearly Conference,-especially if the
right of consent is reserved by charter or agreement to such trustees or
members. Inion Church vs. Saunders, - - - 378
2. A mandamnus cannot issue to compel the school directors to erect a
school house, they having been vested by the Act of Assembly with dis-
cretionary power. In re Manheim Township, . . . . 163
3. The general principle stated in Com. vs. The Judges, 3 Bin. 273,
stated and re-affir,el. Ibid.
7MARRIED WOMAN'S ACT.
1. A married woman in Pennsylvania is not authorized to enter into any
suretyship, or transfer her separate personal estate for the payment of her
ltibanl's debts, nor is the husband authorized to mortgage the wife's
estate, except in the mode prescribed by the act, which must be strictly
pursued. Williams, Executor, vs. Stoops, - - 158
2. The two ndes of construing the married woman's act considered.
Ibid.
MARSIAL
See Sale.
MORTGAGE.
See Interest.
NATURALIZATION.
See Jurisdiction.
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NEGLIGENCE.
1. A party who takes reasonable care to guard against accidents aris-
ing from ordinary causes, is not liable for accidents arising from extraor-
dinary ones ; and therefore,
2. Where a company is incorporated for supplying a street with water,
constructed their apparatus according to the best known system, and kept
it in proper repair for twenty-five years, at the end of which time a frost
of unusual severity acted on the apparatus, so as to cause injury to the
property of another person-Held, that the company were not liable for
negligence. Blyth vs. The Birmingham Water Works Company. - 570
3. Per ALanasox, B.-Negligence consists in the omitting to do some-
thing that a reasonable man would do, or the doing something that a
reasonable man would not do; in either case causing, unintentionally,
mischief to a third party. Ibid.
NEW TRIAL.
In a case involving no question of law, the plaintiff's claim was sup-
ported almost exclusively by his own testimony, and was encountered by
circumstantial evidence op the part of the defendant. A common jury
having found for the plaintiff, a new trial was granted on affidavits dis-
closing fresh evidence. At the second trial, this evidence was adduced,
but the second jury (a special one) found for the plaintiff. The judge
certifying to the court in writing that the verdict was "a very wrong ver-
d;ct," the court granted a third trial, on the ground of its being against
the weight of evidence. Davies vs. Roper, - - - 504
NON-SUIT.
A non-suit will not be taken off which has been granted by reason of
a discrepancy between the allegations in the narr and the proof at the
trial. Jenneson vs. The Camden and Amboy Railroad, - 234
NOTE.
See Broker, Usury.
A person having in his possession negotiable notes, bonds, &c., as col-
lateral security, is not confined exclusively to that security for the pur-
pose of liquidating his demand, but may, unless there is an agreement to
the contrary, maintain his action against the debtor on the original claim.
Harrison vs. Pope, . .. . 313
ORPHANS' COURT.
The Orphans' Court having exclusive jurisdiction of the distribution of
the estates of decedents in the hands of executors and administrators
among those entitled thereto, an action cannot be brought in a court of
common law by a distributee under the intestate laws to recover his share
of the personal estate of a decedent from the administrators. Ashford vs.
Ewing, - - - 294
PARTNERSHIP.
Where a mercantile firm, having executed a promissory note, and after
the maturity thereof, one of said firm, at the request of the payees, who
demanded payment or security, gave to said payees another note signed
by himself and a third person, payable at a subsequent time, secured by
a mortgage on real estate, to the full amount of the original claim; such
original indebtedness is not thereby extinguished, unless by the express
agreement of the parties at the time, or that such transaction was under-
stood by them to have been in full satisfaction of the antecedent liability.
Harrison vs. Pope, .. .. 313
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PATENT.
1. WhcreaFrenchvesselwasrigged in France, wit]h gaffswhich had been
patented in the United States, held, that as the gaffs were placed on the
ves.-cl whcn she was built, as part of her original equipment, in a foreign
country by persons not within the jurisdiction of our patent laws, they
were not within their application, but exempted. Brown vs. Duchesne, 152
2. The patent laws were not intended to apply to, and govern a vessel
of a foreign friendly nation, resorting to our ports by our consent, for
purposes of lawful commerce. Ibid.
3. The plaintiff's first patent for a reaping machine being dated in
1834, has expired, and whatever invention it contained, now belongs to
the public. I bid.
Improvements were made by McCormick, for which, in 1845, he obtained
a patent, and in 1847, a patent for a further improvement, which last
patent was surrendered and re-issued in 1853. McCormick vs. lanny,
let. 1., - - - - - - - - - 277
4. A machine may consist of distinct parts, and some or all these parts
may be claimed as combinations. In such an invention, no part of it is
infringed, unless the entire combination or the part claimed shall have
been pirated. Ibid.
5. In his patent of 1845, for improvements in the reaping machine, the
plaintiff claimed the combination of the bow L, and dividing iron Al, for
separating the wheat to be cut from that which is left standing, andto
press the grain on the cutting sickles and the reel. The defendant's wooden
divider does not infringe that claim of complainant's patent which em-
braces the combination of the bow and the dividing iron, as he does not
use the iron divider which the plaintiff combined with the wooden. Ibid.
6. Where the plaintiff's patent calls for a reel post, set nine inches
behind the cutters, which is extended forward, and connected with the
tongue of the machine to which the horses are geared, it is not infringed
by a reel bearer extending from the hind part of the machine and sus-
tained by one or more braces. The only thing common to both devices is
supporting the end of the reel nearest to the standing grain. In their
combinations and connections, and in everything else, the devices are
different. Ibid.
7. Where reaping machines prior to the plaintiff's invention had a
grain divider or reel post similar to the plaintiff's, the defendantmayuse
the same without infringing the plaintiff's patent. Ibid.
8. The invention embraced in plaintiff's patents of 1847 and 1853 was
not a raker's seat, but it was the improvement of his machine, by which
it was balanced, and the shortening of the reel so -that room was made for
the raker's seat on the extended finger-bar. This being his invention and
claim, to this his exclusive right is limited. Had lie claimed generally
a seat for the raker, the claim would have been invalid, by reason of the
prior knowledge and use of rakers' seats in reaping machines. McCor-
.ick's raker's seat was new in its connection with his machine; but his
invention did not extend to a raker's seat differently arranged. Ibid.
9. A mechanical equivalent is limited to the principle called for in the
patent, including colorable alterations or such as are merely changes as
to form. Ibid.
10. Manny's reaping machine does not infringe either of McCormick's
patents. The divider and reel bearer used in lanny's machine being
different in form and principle, do not infringe McCormick's patent of
1845. Ibid.
11. The stand or position for the forker, invented and patented by John
H. 3Nanny, is a new and useful improvement, and different in form and
principle from McCormick's patents of 1847 and 1853, Ibid.
PLEADING.
See Release.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.
1. Where in the course of a capital trial the witness, a Roman Catiho-
lic clergyman was asked in his examination "if Mrs. C. (the deceased
person) had not made to him in the sacramental confession, acknowledg-
ments of improper or adulterous intercourse," Held, that inasmuch as the
witness' knowledge was not obtained in any civil capacity or as a private
individual, but in the character of a Roman Catholic minister of the sacra-
ment of penance, a sacrament held by that church to be an inviolable and
eternal secret, subjecting the revealer to the severest ecclesiastical pun-
ishments in this world, and as he believed, to eternal punishment as a
sacriligious violation of his oath, the communication was privileged, and -
that the witness might decline answering without subjecting himself to an
attachment for contempt. Commonwealth vs. Cronin. - - - 465
2. As a general principle every person when called upon in a court of
justice is bound to testify whatever he may know touching the matter in-
quired of; a principle, however, subject to certain exceptions, as profes-
sional communications made to attorneys, &c. Ibid.
3. By the language and spirit of the several State and Federal Consti-
tutions, it is obvious that religious toleration was one of the great purposes
that their framers had in view, and that they were intended to secure for-
ever to all the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, and any other construction than one that holds the sacramental
confession a privileged communication would be an invasion of the con-
stitutional boon of religious toleration. Ibid.
PROMISSORY NOTE.
See Usury.
RELEASE.
1. General release discharges land from a condition not to build in a
particular manner. Davis vs. Oberteuffer. - - 423
2. Pleading over admits that the release operated as averred. Ibid.
SALE.
See Marshal.
1. Where the United States marshal sold certain fractional sections of
land as the property of one H., and the purchase money passed into the
public treasury, and it was subsequently ascertained that the land so sold
was not the property of H., but belonged in fact to other persons, and that
H. never had any title to them which could pass by virtue of the sale,
although the sale was made without any notice of any defect of title, and
under the marshal's assurance that he would make a title, the sale being
a judicial sale, the vendee cannot recover the amount of the purchase
money from the plaintiff in the execution, the United States. Puckett vs.
The United States. - - - - 459
2. The marshal is the mere minister of the law, and a due discharge of
his duties does not require him to warrant the title of the property sold,
nor can lie expressly or impliedly bind the plaintiff in the execution, by
any assurance or warranty that he may make at the sale. Ibid.
3. Upon a judicial sale there is no implied warranty of title. Ibid.
4. In all cases of the sale of personalty, there is an implied warranty
of title. Port vs. The United States.
5. Where the United States, while at war with Mexico, seized and sold
some tobacco as enemy's property, which subsequently proved to be other-
wise, the purchase money paid by the vendee can be recovered. Ibid.
6. The authority of military commanders in time of war considered.
Ibid.
SEAMEN.
See Wages.
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SLAVE.
See Acts of Congress.
SPECIFIC PERFORMIANCE.
See Equity.
STATE COURTS.
See Constitutional Law, Legislative Authority.
STOCK.
See Agent.
SURROGATE.
See Infant.
TOTAL LOSS.
See Insurance.
USURY.
See Lem Loci.
1. It is fully settled in Pennsylvania, that a vendee has a right to
purchase a security at a greater discount than 6 per cent., but he must be
a purchaser in good faith, and not participate in any contrivance to evade
the statute against usury. Gaul vs. Willis, - - - 561
2. The difference between the English and the. Pennsylvania statutes
against usury stated. Ibid.3. Where A draws a promissory note in the usual form, to raise money
by its sale, purporting to be "for value received," and B endorses the note
to C, who sells it to D at a discount of one and one-half per cent. per
month, the latter having no notice whatever, of the purpose for which the
note was made, and having neither loaned nor intended to loan money on
it to the maker or first endorser, A, cannot be heard even after a release,
to give evidence to invalidate the security in the hands of D, a bona fide
holder, on the ground of usury or failure in the original consideration.
Ibid.
WAGES.
The rule which deprived the seamen of wages if no freight was earned,
does not apply to the master of a ship; and therefore, where a ship was
lost, the administratrix of the captain was entitled to maintain an action
for wages for the period of his service before the loss. Hawkins vs.
Twyzill, . . . .. 563
WARD.
See Guardian.
WARRANTY.
See Sale.
1. In an action for a breach of warranty, by the vendee against the
vendor of goods, who has warranted them to be of a particular denomina-
tion, but not according to sample, it is a proper question for the jury
whether the amount of adulteration in the goods supplied, be such as to
alter their distinctive character. Wicler vs. Schillizzi, - - 502
2. A undertook to supply B with certain parcels of linseed, which he
warranted should be "Calcutta linseed," and supplied him with linseed
containing 15 per cent. of other seeds. It was proved that "Calcutta
linseed," at the time the contract was made, contained usually from 2 to 3
INDEX.
per cent. of other seeds. The jury were asked whether this was such an
adulteration or admixture of foreign substances as to alter the distinctive
character of the article, and prevent its being saleable as Calcutta linseed;
and whether this adulteration was sueh as might reasonably be expected:
Held, no misdirection. Ibid.
WILL.
See Bequest.
1. The provision of the code of Louisiana, which requires for the proof
of an olographic will, the "testimony of two credible witnesses, who de-
clare that they recognize the testament as entirely written, dated, and
signed, in the testator's handwriting, as having often seen him write and
sign during his lifetime," (Art. 1648,) is directory merely, and does not,
where such proof is wanting by reason of accident, as in the case of a lost
or destroyed will, exclude secondary evidence of the will. LEA, J., dis-
senting. Gaines' Appeal, . . . . . . 864
2. Contents of an alleged lost or destroyed olographic will, admitted to
probate after the expiration of forty years, the delay being explained upon
evidence establishing the former existence and principal contents of such
a will, and the probability of its due execution in accordance with the
Code; though it did not affirmatively appear that the witnesses had ever
seen the testator write or sign his name, in his lifetime. LEA, J., dis-
senting. Ibid.
3. When the decedent failed to declare to the subscribing witnesses
that the paper which they were called to attest was his last will and tes-
tament, but simply acknowledged his signature, and requested theni to
sign at a particular place, pointed out by him-Held, that this was not a
valid testamentary declaration. Hunt vs. Mootrie, - - 895
4. The knowledge of the character of the instrument gained by the sub-
scribing witnesses from looking at the attestation clause, does not con-
stitute a testamentary declaration by the decedent, unless it was clearly
obtained by his request or direction, or at the least his consent and priv-
ity. Ibid.
6. If anything is to be taken as- substitution for an express declaration
it must be such an act as is clear and dinequivocal, and as gives the basis
for a necessary inference that the testator conveyed, intended to convey,
and knew he had conveyed to the minds of the witnesses, that he executed
the paper as his last will and testament. I bid.
6. There must be mutuality as to the knowledge of all the parties, tes-
tator and witnesses, in respect to the nature of the transaction, and this
must be evinced with reasonable definiteness by the facts. Ibid.
7. The declaration must be made to each of the witnesses, at the time
of subscribing or acknowledging, and as part of the transaction; it must
be made in the presence of the parties, and must point to the particular
instrument in process of execution. Ibid.
WITNESS.
See Privileged Communication, Will.
